Civil Code and Related Subjects: Conventional Obligations by Smith, J. Denson
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 7 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1945-1946 Term
January 1947
Civil Code and Related Subjects: Conventional
Obligations
J. Denson Smith
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
J. Denson Smith, Civil Code and Related Subjects: Conventional Obligations, 7 La. L. Rev. (1947)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol7/iss2/6
THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
portunity to overrule this unfortunate jurisprudence. It restrain-
ed itself, however, to the mere statement that the status of mar-
riage was incompatible with parental custody.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
During the period here being considered, the supreme court
had before it nine cases under this title involving the admissi-
bility of parol evidence in relation to a written act. In general,
the cases adhere to the view that except where fraud or error
is alleged or the act is indefinite or ambiguous parol evidence is
inadmissible to vary or contradict any recital, whether factual
or promissory, contained therein. A further limitation exists in
the rule that where a charge of error rests only a lack of knowl-
edge concerning the provisions of the act, occasioned by a failure
to read it or to listen attentively while it is being read, relief
will not be granted.
The last mentioned rule was relied on in Rousseau v. Rous-
seau,1 in rejecting an offer of parol evidence to contradict a re-
cital that the property covered by a deed was being purchased
with the wife's paraphernal funds.
The rule that parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of
explaining the terms used in a written act if they are incomplete
or their meaning is uncertain was applied in Walker v. Fer-
chaud2 to complete the description of the property covered by
an offer to purchase which referred to it only by its municipal
street number, and in Plaquemines Oil and Development Com-
pany v. State" to explain the meaning of the words "east" and
"west" in a patent prepared by the Registrar of the State Land
Office. Similar evidence was admitted in Krauss v. Fry' to ex-
plain the true intention of the parties in a deed containing a
mineral reservation clause.
A kindred problem was presented in Gulf Refining Company
v. Garrett.5 The dispute concerned the interpretation of a settle-
ment agreement between a widow and certain heirs of the dece-
dent. On rehearing the case was remanded for the introduction
of parol evidence. The Chief Justice and Judge Rogers dissented,
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 209 La. 428, 24 So.(2d) 676 (1946).
2. 210 La. 283, 26 So.(2d) 746 (1946).
3. 208 La. 425, 23 So.(2d) 171 (1945).
4. 209 La. 250, 24 So.(2d) 464 (1945).
5. 209 La 674, 25 So.(2d) 329 (1946).
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their position being that the procedure of remanding the case
was improper under the circumstances because (1) it was not
requested by the parties litigant, (2) no evidence of any conse-
quence was excluded and (3) the case had been pending a num-
ber of years and warranted final disposition. Parol evidence is
admissible, of course, to explain an ambiguity, but it is difficult
to read the case without feeling that the position of the dissen-
ters was correct.
The case of Fontenot v. Jones" presented the question of the
admissibility of parol evidence to show a contemporaneous oral
agreement suspending the effectiveness of a lease. The court
found it unnecessary to determine the admissibility of the prof-
fered evidence inasmuch as it was considered insufficient in any
event to sustain the defendant's theory. Although evidence of
this type would be admitted at common law, its admissibility in
Louisiana is open to considerable doubt in view of Louisiana
Civil Code Article 2276.
Louisiana has long recognized the propriety of reforming a
contract so as to cause it to express the true intention of the
parties where mutual error is the basis of the relief sought. This
rule was applied in Brulatour v. Teche Sugar Company, Incor-
porated7 where parol evidence was admitted to show mutual
error in the description of property in a deed.
This rule was also apparently the basis of the acceptance in
Baker v. Baker' of parol evidence offered by an eighty-three
year old negro who was unable to read or write to show that an
act of sale was intended to be an act of mortgage. The court then
held that the evidence was likewise admissible for the purpose
of showing that a subsequent retransfer of the property for a
purported consideration of three hundred dollars was for the
purpose of revesting the record title in the plaintiff. It was said
that since the two acts were co-related and vitally connected,
evidence admissible as to one was pertinent, relevant, and ad-
missible as to the other. The contest was between the heirs of
the original owner and a second wife who was basing her claim
that the property was community property on the charge that
it was acquired by the community at the time of the re-transfer.
Another suit to reform a deed went up as Taylor v. Taylor
where the court permitted parol evidence to show that the real
6. 210 La. 166, 26 So.(2d) 490 (1946).
7. 209 La. 717, 25 So.(2d) 444 (1946).
8. 209 La. 1041, 26 So.(2d) 132 (1946).
9. 208 La. 1053, 24 So.(2d) 74 (1945).
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consideration was the settlement and discharge of claims in a
pending suit, instead of a personal donation as recited therein.
It must be taken that the nature of the action distinguishes this
case from earlier ones where parol was not admitted to vary a
recital of consideration. A full discussion of this problem will be
found in a previous issue of this review. °
The case of Stoufflet v. Duplantis" involved an attempt to
set aside a quitclaim deed on the basis of fraud. The suit failed,
because the plaintiff was unable to show a degree of fraud suf-
ficient to justify the relief prayed for.
The morality of the civil law was forcefully defended in
American Guaranty Company v. Sunset Realty and Planting
Company" where on rehearing the court recognized the plain-
tiff's right to set aside two quitclaim deeds on the ground that
they had been obtained through fraud. The fraud consisted in
partially true statements made by the purchaser who was pos-
sessed of much more information than that given to the seller.
The court reaffirmed the rule that although the parties to a con-
tract are not obligated to make any statement with reference to
the title, condition, or value of the subject matter, any party
undertaking to speak with reference thereto is obligated to tell
the whole truth and may not conceal or suppress any material
facts. It also expressed the opinion that an invitation by such
person to the other that he make his own investigation was, un-
der the circumstances, an aggravating factor. The rule was ex-
tended so as to encompass material facts peculiarly within the
knowledge of the principal who was acting through an agent.
The court also held invalid a second quitclaim deed, purporting
to be a re-draft of the first, because it contained material altera-
tions surreptitiously inserted by the purchaser. The position taken
by the court seems eminently sound and should serve as a warn-
ing to those who would undertake to lead others to believe that
the whole facts as known are being stated when material facts
are being intentionally withheld.
In Herbert v. American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers,8 the court applied the generally well-recognized
rule that a prohibition against assignment is for the benefit of
the debtor of the obligation and may be waived by him. The
10. Comment, Parol Evidence to vary a Recital of Consideration (1941)
3 L umANA LAW RzmVW 427.
11. 208 La. 186, 23 So.(2d) 41 (1945).
12. 208 La. 772, 23 So.(2d) 409 (1945).
13. 210 La. 240, 26 So.(2d) 732 (1946).
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effort on the part of the plaintiff to revoke an assignment pre-
viously recognized by the debtor, on the sole ground that the
by-laws of the association forbade the assignment was found
without legal support. The assignment itself, being part of a
judicially approved settlement of the community effects between
the plaintiff and his former wife, was held to constitute the law
between the parties. The court also upheld the propriety of the
debtor's action in interpleading the claimants under Act 123 of
1922.
An allegation of lesion beyond moiety was the basis of plain-
tiff's suit in Blaize v. Cazezu.14 The court took the practical view
that personal knowledge of a witness based on other sales in the
locality is not indispensable, and that the lack of such knowledge
or absence of proof of other sales affects only the weight of the
evidence. It held that all that is required is that the opinion of
the witness be based upon acquaintance either with the property
in question or with other property of like character and location.
In order to enable the proper disposition of the defendant's re-
quest for an opportunity to elect between paying the difference
in value of the interest purchased or returning the property, the
case was remanded for additional evidence covering such value.
In Glassell, Taylor and Robinson v. John W. Harris Associ-
ates, Incorporated15 the court ruled that when a general contractor
arbitrarily terminates a sub-contract the sub-contractor is en-
titled to recover as for a breach or on the basis of a quantum
meruit for the work or materials furnished. It was found that
the timely recordation of liens by the sub-contractor gave him
a personal cause of action in solido against the general contractor
and the owner, since the general contract was not recorded, and
a right in rem with respect to subsequent purchasers of the pro-
ject. The Chief Justice concurred in the decree but questioned
the advisability of the court's committing itself by certain dicta
concerning the application of Section 12 of Act 298 of 1926.
In Colgm v. Security Storage and Van Company, Incorporat-
ed,16 the court refused to hold a bailor bound by a provision of
the warehouse receipt limiting the liability of the bailee. Cases
dealing with parking tickets, baggage checks, and the like were
cited in support of its conclusion. It distinguished an Ohio case
where there was printed across the face of a warehouse receipt
14. 210 La. 176, 26 So.(2d) 689 (1946).
15. 209 La. 957, 26 So.(2d) 1 (1946).
16. 208 La. 173, 23 So.(2d) 386 (1945).
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in red ink an admonition to read the "contract" carefully, and a
New York case where a long course of dealing, plus possession
of a book of bills of lading, was held sufficient to charge the
bailor with knowledge that the document contained terms of a
contract. The question to be decided in all such cases is whether
or not acceptance of the document indicates assent to its terms.
This depends in turn upon whether the acceptor has reason to
know that it contains the terms of a contract. Courts of common
law jurisdictions have split in answering this question with ref-
erence to warehouse receipts and bills of lading. The Louisiana
court split here, with Chief Justice O'Niell and Judge Rogers
dissenting. The weight of authority is with the dissenters."7
In Pennington v. Drews8 the court overruled an exception of
no right and no cause of action in a suit to restrain violation of
a contract concerning the use of an atomiscope, a device devel-
oped for mineral exploration, and the personal services of the
inventor. The court refused, with reason, to find that the con-
tract was subject to a potestative condition. A provision of the
contract imposing a penalty was not considered a sufficient basis
for disallowing the relief sought, on the ground that the aggriev-
ed party had an adequate remedy at law, since the penalty was
not provided for non-performance of the principal obligation.
The relief granted by the court was in the form of restraining
the defendant from doing acts prohibited by the contract. A
showing of irreparable injury was its basis.
An attempt to recover against the father of a purchaser of
furniture for resale failed in Perfection Mattress and Spring
Company v. Sliman"9 the evidence showing that the son alone
was the buyer and debtor. An offer on the part of the father to
assume the indebtedness was abortive through lack of agree-
ment by the creditors.
The plaintiffs in the case of Guarisco v. Pennsylvania Casu-
alty Company20 accepted a payment by a railroad company in
settlement of claims asserted against it growing out of a colli-
sion between a train and an automobile in which plaintiffs' sons,
riding as guests in the automobile, were killed. Thereafter plain-
tiffs brought two suits against the insurer of the operator of the
automobile. The suits were consolidated for trial. By way of
17. See Williston and Thompson, Selections from Williston on Contracts
(1938) §90 B.
18. 209 La. 1, 24 So.(2d) 156 (1945).
19. 209 La. 153, 24 So.(2d) 295 (1945).
20. 209 La. 435, 24 So.(2d) 678 (1945).
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defense the insurer filed an exception of no right of action and
pleaded in bar the release given to the railroad without a reserva-
tion of rights. The exceptions and pleas in bar were overruled on
the ground that there had been no showing that the railroad was
a joint wrongdoer. The earlier case of Reid v. Lowden" was dis-
tinguished on the ground it was conceded in that case that the
party released was a co-tortfeasor. The court indicated in its
opinion a possibility that a showing might still be made that the
accident occurred through the joint negligence of the railroad
and the operator of the automobile but the method by which
this might be done was not indicated. This and other aspects of




Article 3066 of the Civil Code provides that "a judicial surety
cannot demand the discussion of the property of the principal
debtor.
"But no suit shall be instituted against any surety on appeal
bond, nor on the bond of any administrator, tutor, curator, exe-
cutor, or syndic until the necessary steps have been taken to
enforce payment against the principal."'
The question of what constitute the requisite "necessary
steps ... to enforce payment" was presented to the court in
Posey v. Hamner.2 That case was an action on a tutor's bond, by
his children, after the death of the tutor. The defendants, sureties
on the tutorship bond, urged successfully an exception of pre-
maturity on the ground that judicial proceedings were necessary
against the principal debtor or his representative prior to the
institution of suit against his sureties. This even though the tutor
may have died without leaving any property whatever, and
judicial proceedings against his succession would be "a vain and
useless effort."8
It is well established that "the necessary steps" required by
Article 3066 do not include the issuance of writs of execution
against the estates of deceased principal debtors prior to suit
21. 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939).
* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 3066, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. 27 So.(2d) 158 (La. 1946).
3. 27 So.(2d) 158, 159.
[VOL. VII
